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Constraints on Pursuing Corporate Opportunities
Stanley M. Beck*
The question of corporate opportunity is one of the most difficult and, at
the same time, one of the most interesting with respect to fiduciary
duties. The Anglo-Canadian courts, and to an extent the American
courts, have had a difficult time establishing any clear guidelines. The
Canadian courts have taken a strict fiduciary approach. For example,
the law of trusts for children has been applied in corporate opportunity
cases, and such "simple" cases as Keech v. Sandford I (from 1726) and
the later case of Parker v. McKenna2 (from 1874) have been repeatedly
cited by courts considering this issue.
The language of Lord Justice James in Parker v. McKenna was that
the court was not entitled to receive any evidence as to whether the prin-
cipal did or did not suffer an injury, for the "safety of mankind requires
that no agent shall be able to put his principal to the danger"3 of such an
inquiry. This led Lord Justice Roscoe to remark in a 1972 case that,
although he agreed with the basic principle, in a nuclear age that might
be a slight exaggeration. Nonetheless, he and the English courts contin-
ued to apply that test. If there was a taking of what was deemed to be
corporate property, no inquiry was made into whether the corporation
really did suffer an injury, what the nature of the benefit received by the
principal was, or whether it would be unjust to allow the principal to
obtain the benefit.
Instead, the basic rule of equity that no fiduciary may profit from his
position as such (or the allied principle that no agent may be allowed to
put himself in a position where his interest conflicts with his duty) is
applied. Essentially, the courts have refused to ask the unjust enrich-
ment questions: Has there really been a benefit conferred upon the prin-
cipal? Is it at the company's expense? And if so, is it unjust in the
circumstances to allow the agent to retain the benefit?
These questions have an appealing sound of simple certainty, but
* Chairman, Ontario Securities Commission (formerly Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, in Downsview, Ontario). This article is an edited version of the author's
presentation at the Conference on Comparative Corporation Law sponsored by the Canada-United
States Law Institute in Cleveland, Ohio, in October 1984. As chairman of the Ontario Securities
Commission, the author has not had the luxury of time to write a more scholarly piece on this
important topic.
I Keech v. Sandford (1762), Sel. Cas. Ch. 61 (fol.), 25 E.R. 223, [1558-1774] All E.R. 230.
2 Parker v. McKenna (1874), L.RL 10 Ch. App. 96.
3 Ibid. at 125.
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loss and gain can be complex factors. There is no simple analysis here.
Each branch has to be seen in relation to the others and these relation-
ships often involve very complex fact situations. The difficulty with this
rigid approach is that it leads to some tough results. In those cases, fidu-
ciaries who have shown initiative, taken risks on behalf of the company,
and produced a commensurate gain are required to give up their profits.
A constructive trust may even be imposed upon their property.
The essential question is whether that approach is necessary. Is the
"blinkered application of fiduciary doctrine" necessary to protect inves-
tors from self-regarding activities of corporate managers? What are the
costs of such an application? Will fiduciaries (executive managers) be
deterred from engaging in activity that will both enrich them and have a
positive economic impact on the corporation as well? If they are de-
terred, will there be a greater incentive to seek surreptitious gain? I've
always liked Professor Dodd's characterization of corporate executives as
exemplifying the peculiar idea of vicarious acquisitiveness. An econo-
mist might say that this is a result of fiduciaries showing expense prefer-
ence and finding ways to seek gain other than the bargained-for
compensation. The question might also be asked whether economic op-
portunities will go undeveloped if those who possess information, exper-
tise, and incentive are barred from participating.
On the other hand, one can refer to the benefits of retaining a strict
trust approach. That type of strict fiduciary rule is efficient in the sense
that it avoids the costs of shareholder policing. There is a clear line
which fiduciaries must not cross, even at the cost of occasional unjust
results. If one is talking about compensation, then why not openly bar-
gained-for and disclosed compensation? There are many forms which it
could take. For instance, in three or four (rather cryptic) lines of its last
few proxy statements, the Cadillac Fairview Corporation, Canada's larg-
est public real estate company and a large player in the American real
estate market, has announced that in order to compensate its executives
it has acquired "phantom interests" in listed real estate developments in
Canada and the United States. A "phantom interest" is a profit-sharing
scheme. The executives are given as compensation a percentage of the
new real estate developments that Cadillac Fairview is entering into, pre-
sumably as a spur to look for wealth-maximizing developments for the
company.
Is it not a better rule to have that kind of bargained-for and dis-
closed compensation for executives rather than relaxing equity's strict
rules? Equally important, is it not to the advantage of the enterprise to
have managers who are devoted solely to its welfare rather than to their
own (possibly in competition)? As for economic opportunities, will they
not be developed by others if in fact they are viable propositions? The
answer to those questions is probably "yes."
Let me move now from those essential questions to some of the
cases, because it is only in the context of the cases that we can ask the
Vol 13:143 1988
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difficult questions. Regal (Hastings), Ltd. v. Gulliver4 is the classic An-
glo-Canadian example (it was a House of Lords decision adopted by the
Supreme Court of Canada). This decision was the law in Canada until
the 1974 Supreme Court decision in Canadian Aero Service Ltd v.
O'Malley. 5
In Regal (Hastings), the company was in the theater business; it
owned one theater and wanted to acquire leaseholds on two others and
then sell the three as a going concern. To pick up the leaseholds of the
other two, it formed a wholly-owned subsidiary. The owner of the other
theaters was willing to lease, but would not do so unless the subsidiary
had a paid-up capital of £5,000 or unless the directors gave their personal
guarantee. This proposal was made to the board at a meeting at which
some of the directors were willing to give their guarantee, but the major-
ity was not. They looked at the financial situation of the parent and
found it could afford only £2,000. The solicitor had the idea that the
directors might provide the remaining £3,000. In fact, five of the direc-
tors put £600 each into the capital of the subsidiary. The subsidiary then
had £5,000 of paid-up capital and the agreement was completed.
Later, the sale of the three theaters as a going concern fell through.
However, another purchaser came along and, while it did not purchase
the assets, it did purchase shares in the parent and in the subsidiary. A
handsome profit was made by all, not just the directors (the directors'
profit on their 3,000 shares was some £7,000), and Regal was owned
wholly by a new controlling shareholder. But then the new controlling
shareholder took a closer look at the facts (or its smart solicitor looked at
the corporate history) and decided there had been a breach of fiduciary
duty.7
An action was begun alleging the taking of a corporate opportunity.
The Court of Appeal said no corporate opportunity was taken; rather,
the agreement was to the advantage of the company.' There was no pos-
sibility of the company taking up the opportunity and everybody had
profited. Moreover, to rule in favor of the purchaser/plaintiff would be
to provide him with an unbargained-for windfall.
The House of Lords unanimously reversed. It went back to the lan-
guage of Parker v. McKenna and Keech v. Sandford-the child trust lan-
guage-and said that the opportunity came to the directors in the course
of the execution of their office. While trying to expand the business of
Regal, they took part of the opportunity for themselves. In those cir-
cumstances it was corporate property that was improperly taken; the di-
rectors must account for these takings.9
4 Regal (Hastings), Ltd v. Gulliver (1942), [1942] 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.).
5 Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley (1973), [1974] S.C.R. 592.
6 Regal (Hastings), supra, note 4 at 378, 380.
7 Ibid. at 385 (Russell L.J.).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid. at 380-81.
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The difficulty, of course, was that the purchasers received in one
hand part of what had been paid out by the other. Only Lord Porter
recognized this difficulty, although he still went along with the court's
decision."0
The House of Lords said the profit rule is of "vital importance" to
the honest conduct of a fiduciary.'1 The essential question, however, is
whether a prophylactic rule is necessary. Unfortunately, the court did
not discuss what might be characterized as two unjust enrichments (if
that is in fact what happened): unjust enrichment in the "new" Regal,
which recouped part of its purchase price, and also unjust enrichment
with respect to the directors who took up the shares in the subsidiary.
Regal (Hastings) should be examined more closely. The five direc-
tors were the controlling shareholders. Their position, which does not
seem to have been doubted, was that the company could not afford to
take up an extra £3,000 worth of shares.12 (One can recognize the Irving
Trust Co. v. Deutsch 13 discussion of financial incapacity to take up an
opportunity.) Several questions arise here: Was it proper for the direc-
tors to make the decision if they were in a controlling situation? If they
wanted to put their own money into the venture, was there not an obliga-
tion for them to ask the other shareholders if they would care to partici-
pate? One of the directors was in charge of the corporation's finances.
What effort was made, or ought an effort be required in those circum-
stances, to go out and raise money? Would that have been reasonable?
The whole financial incapacity question is one of the most difficult ques-
tions in corporate opportunity. Regal (Hastings) places sharp focus on
these difficult questions.
The other factor involved was that once the directors contributed
£3,000 of the £5,000 of capital into the subsidiary, Regal no longer con-
trolled the subsidiary. The directors were in the controlling position,
with all that that implies and at that point were in some sense competing
with Regal. Although the minority shareholder was still Regal, and that
which was advantageous to the subsidiary would also have been advanta-
geous to the parent, there were possibilities for conflict.
A 1978 case in the Appellate Division of the Alberta Supreme Court
involved a not unusual situation. In Abbey Glen Property Corp. v.
Strumborg,14 a development company was formed by two individuals
who had been real estate developers for some time. They formed a com-
pany called Terra Developers Ltd. and ultimately took it public to the
point where, although they were the chief executive officers, they only
10 Ibid. at 394-95.
11 Ibid. at 385 (Russel L.J.), 391 (McMillan L.J.), 394 (Wright L.J.).
12 Ibid. at 378, 382.
13 See Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch (1934), 73 F.2d 121 at 124 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, (1934),
294 U.S. 708.
14 (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 35, [1978] 4 W.W.R. 28, 9 A.R. 234 (Alta S.C.A.D.) [hereinafter
Abbey Glen cited to D.L.R.].
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held 10% of the shares. At the same time, they retained some real estate
interests themselves, essentially consisting of raw land on the periphery
of Edmonton. It was understood "to some indeterminate extent" that
they had real estate interests of their own and that no accounting would
be required."5
Like all real estate companies, it needed a lot of financing from
larger companies. The Stumborg brothers, who were the parties in inter-
est, wrote to Traders Finance, one of Canada's largest finance companies,
and suggested entering into joint ventures with Terra Developers Inc.
Two Traders officials flew to Edmonton to look at Terra's lands, which
were presented as a Terra development. The Stumborgs duly drove them
around the outskirts of Edmonton, showed them the Terra land, and also
showed them their own land. They were, in effect, driving around look-
ing at available real estate. Their own lands were not discussed. Subse-
quently, the brothers were invited to Toronto to discuss a further
development; again, only Terra's lands were considered. 6
Some four months later, Traders wrote to the Stumborgs and said it
would not deal with Terra; it wanted to deal with the Stumborgs, and
since they controlled only 10% of Terra, Traders refused to deal with
Terra. Traders was interested in the two parcels of land owned person-
ally by the Stumborgs and wanted to join in their development. The
development went ahead as a joint venture. 17
Again, there was the same situation as in Regal (Hastings). Terra
was sold to a company called Western Realty and a new company
emerged, Abbey Glen, which was wholly controlled by a single new
shareholder. 8 Again, the lawyers looked at the transactions and saw a
cause of action against the Stumborg brothers. Essentially, the trial
court found that the Stumborgs had acted in perfect good faith. 9 They
had used their best efforts to get the Traders development for Terra but
were not able to do so. The court held, nonetheless, that an accounting
was necessary, citing Regal (Hastings).
Why was an accounting necessary? Because when Traders was first
shown the land, it was shown by the Stumborgs who were acting on be-
half of Terra, notwithstanding that Traders refused to develop that land
with Terra and turned down the Stumborgs' proposition to finance Terra
in the development. The Stumborgs were acting "in the course and exe-
cution of their office" because when they wrote to Traders they wrote on
Terra's letterhead and when they drove around they were driving around
on behalf of Terra. The Stumborgs, therefore, had to give back the gains
from the opportunity they exploited.20
IS Ibid. at 54-55 (Clement J.A.).
16 Ibid. at 55-57 (Clement J.A.).
17 Ibid. at 40 (McDermid J.A., dissenting).
18 Ibid. at 37 (McDermid J.A., dissenting).
19 Ibid. at 42, 53 (McDermid J.A., dissenting).
20 Ibid. at 60-64 (Clement J.A.).
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There was a dissent in the Court of Appeal that relied on the deci-
sion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bangor Punta v. Bangor & Aroostook
Railway.21 The dissent claimed that this was a case of unjust enrichment.
There was a new controller here and the new purchaser should not profit
by what is considered a breach of corporate opportunity.22
Abbey Glen raises some of the same questions as Regal (Hastings).
In both, there was an honest refusal by a third party to deal with the
principal. The question is: What should be the position of the fiduciary
agent in those circumstances? That raises a difficult question of disclo-
sure, which is clearly what the court was insisting on and which the Re-
gal (Hastings) and other courts have said is the medicine that cures the
breach.23 But disclosure is not without its problems. To whom is disclo-
sure made in those circumstances?
In the Regal (Hastings) situation, the interested directors were the
controllers. What good will it do to make disclosure to the board under
those circumstances? Should the rule be that disclosure ought to be
made to the shareholders in those circumstances? And in Abbey Glen,
should the Stumborgs have made disclosure to the board and asked the
board's permission? One must also ask the question: What constitutes
full disclosure under these circumstances? Are there dangers in saying
that there only has to be disclosure to the board depending on the rela-
tionship of the executives involved to the board, particularly in a public
company? What incentive is there for the board, and particularly for
outside directors, to police executive management in these
circumstances?
Furthermore, if one is talking about disclosure to shareholders, then
one is again talking about the level of disclosure and how much is dis-
closed. One is also talking about the control of proxy machinery and all
that that involves. Is it the interested directors who control the proxy
machinery (remembering the natural tendency of shareholders to go
along with management)? Finally, if what we are talking about is "cor-
porate property," can any majority of shareholders sanction the fiduci-
ary's taking it? If the analogy is to giving away corporate property, then
is not the rule one of unanimity?
Also clearly raised in Abbey Glen is the issue of competition. Should
executive officers in the public company ever be allowed to put them-
selves in a position where they are competing with their principal? That
happens in real estate development and, as in the next case to be dis-
cussed, it happens in junior resource development, both in Canada and in
the United States. Those who are promoters of junior oil and gas compa-
nies and mining companies regularly promote many concerns. They are
always being offered properties. They put them in one company or an-
21 Bangor Punta v. Bangor & Aroostook Railway (1974), 417 U.S. 703.
22 Abbey Glen, supra, note 14 at 49-51 (McDermid J.A., dissenting).
23 See Regal (Hastings), supra, note 4 at 386, 391 & 394-95.
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other that they are running and for which they are raising the finances.
Who are they acting for? What hat are they wearing at any one time?
Junior public companies are being floated constantly on the Denver Ex-
change and on the Vancouver Exchange. How does the law deal with
that sort of problem?
The next case to look at is Peso Silver Mines Ltd. v. Cropper, which
also went to the Supreme Court of Canada, and is exactly the above type
of situation.24 Peso was a silver mining company with extensive claims
in the Yukon area of northern Canada. A gentleman named Cropper,
along with a colleague named Walker, were the chief parties in interest
and the promoters. Dr. Aho, a geologist, presented Peso with new
claims-the "Dickson" claims. Some of these claims were contiguous to
Peso's existing claims, and some were further away. The board consid-
ered the claims but decided to turn down the opportunity, since the com-
pany already had over a thousand acres at stake and was running out of
money.25
Within six weeks Cropper, Aho, and Walker, along with two other
directors, formed a new company to pick up the Dickson claims. At the
same time, Walker wrote to the Superintendent of Brokers in charge of
securities trading in British Columbia to explain their actions. He ex-
plained in the letter that "we" are interested in that property and want to
protect "our" position and therefore formed a new company to pick up
the claims. "Our position" referred to the position of Peso Silver
Mines.26
Once again, the same situation arose as in Abbey Glen and Regal
(Hastings). Peso Mines was sold to Charter Oil, which then became the
sole controller of Peso, and an action was brought against Cropper,
Walker and the others for breach of fiduciary duty. This time the trial
court said there was a bona fide rejection by the board. When the direc-
tors and others picked up the claims six weeks later, they were not acting
in the course or in the execution of their office as directors. Their actions
were approved both in the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of
Canada.27
The difficulty with this decision was that Cropper, who was the chief
operating officer, was in New York at the time these transactions took
place. He was raising finance capital for his own interest in the new com-
pany. But if Peso was interested in the new claims, and wanted to "pro-
tect its position," then why could not Cropper raise more money for Peso
rather than for the new company? Another difficulty is that the court
found that Peso really did have all the land it needed. It really was short
24 Peso Silver Mines Ltd. v. Cropper (1965), 56 D.L.R. (2d) 117 (B.C.C.A.), aff'd (1966), [1966]
S.C.R. 673.
25 Ibid. at 120-21.
26 Ibid. at 132-33.
27 Ibid. at 140.46.
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of funds and it did not make sense to raise funds for land it did not
want. 8 The problem is whether the courts ought to put themselves into
the position of sorting out that type of question.
Still another difficult point is that when the Dickson claims were
purchased, they were put into a new private company and subsequently
vended into a public company which did a new issue. That is a common
scenario, except that Cropper and Walker were then running the new
public company. How do they protect Peso's interest now that a new
public company has the contingent Dickson Claims? What about the
interests of the new public shareholders? These questions raise the diffi-
cult problems that arise out of competing situations. There are also other
scenarios, such as where another geologist comes along, as they often do,
wiafh claims on lands that are contingent to both claims. How do the
chief executive officers and the directors/fiduciaries handle that
situation?
One other issue which needs to be mentioned is that while Regal
was a private company, Peso and Abbey Glen were public companies.
Should there be different rules? Are there different expectations in the
shareholders of a private company with respect to what their fiduciaries
might do, given the state of their knowledge at the time they enter into
the private company? That was the situation in Burg v. Horn.29 What
were the reasonable expectations of the parties at the time? Is that the
question that the court ought to ask or ought the court to insist on con-
tractual terms? That is, should those expectations be reduced to writing,
and if they're not, should the "familiar fiduciary learning" principle be
applied whether it is a private company or a public company?
There is something to be said for different rules for the private com-
pany situation as opposed to the public company situation. Professors
Brudney and Clark's position is that, with respect to the public company,
there ought to be a categorical approach.30 The opportunities available
to a public company are infinite. This is especially true today, with the
growth of conglomerates. Everything is within the ken of a public com-
pany and, therefore, corporate opportunity is as large as economic op-
portunity can make it. For the private company, however, a selective
approach should be adopted, a more traditional approach that uses an
interest or expectancy line of analysis. That is, what was the bargain of
the private parties with respect to the private company? Questions like
these have yet to be resolved.
A final case which should be examined is a 1974 Canadian Supreme
Court decision, Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley,3" in which the
28 Ibid. at 129, 130.
29 Burg v. Horn (1967), 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.).
30 See V. Brudney & R.C. Clark, "A New Look at Corporate Opportunities" (1981) Harv. L.
Rev. 997.
31 Canadian Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley, supra, note 5.
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court broke away from some of the language in Regal (Hastings). How
far it has broken away remains to be seen. The facts in Canadian Aero
Service were unexceptional. Two senior officers in the company worked
on a particular development for a five-year period. They left the com-
pany and within one month formed their own company and took up the
contract they had been working on. The astonishing thing about the case
is that both the trial court and the Court of Appeal reached the same
result: the fiduciaries were allowed to leave the company and take up the
opportunity. Both courts said they had resigned their offices and they
were employees, not appointed executive officers. The Supreme Court of
Canada, however, said that that made no difference. They were active as
officers whether they were appointed or not. The Court said that they
could not simply resign and take up an emerging opportunity that they
had been working on for a five-year period.32
An interesting aspect of the case concerns capacity. The reason the
two officers left was that the company they worked for was a wholly
owned subsidiary of an American company, Litton Industries. They
were working on a mapping project for Guyana, which was going to re-
quire Canadian foreign aid. It was the Canadian government's policy
that foreign aid would not go to a company that was foreign owned. The
two officers then left to set up their own company and successfully bid on
the mapping project. Though this aspect of the case is not often dis-
cussed, it does present an interesting question.
In reversing the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court said it
was a mistake to place the corporate opportunity doctrine of Regal (Has-
tings) in a "strait jacket" of special knowledge acquired while acting as a
director or senior officer. 3 It was also a mistake to limit it to benefits
acquired by reason of, or during the holding of, those offices. The Court
said that that was simply too narrow a view, particularly concerning a
public company.34
One must look at the entire context, at least in the public company
context, of moving towards a positive obligation to advance the interests
of the corporation. That is, opportunities do not come to directors while
they are sitting in the board room. They come to them because they are
businessmen in a particular line or lines of business. Whether they get
the information on the golf course, at lunch, or on the weekend, does not
make a great deal of difference; the essential question is whether it is an
opportunity that ought properly to be within the development scope of
the company.
What, then, should replace the Regal (Hastings) strait jacket? In
Canadian Aero Service, Chief Justice Laskin examined the American
cases in some detail and concluded that what emerges from them is "an
32 Ibid. at 606.
33 Ibid. at 619.
34 Ibid.
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imprecise ethical standard. ' 35 Although he was not too happy with that
standard, it is really where his judgment ends up. He said that the most
the Court could do was set out a number of factors to be considered,
rather than set out a single test. He articulated the factors as follows:
"[T]he factor of position or office held, the nature of the corporate oppor-
tunity, its ripeness, its specificness [sic] and the director's or managerial
officer's relation to it, the amount of knowledge possessed, the circum-
stances in which it was obtained and whether it was special or, indeed,
even private. "36
That is the "laundry list" of factors to be considered and I regard it
as a useful approach. I do not think that this is an area where a single
test is helpful, or even useful, given the nature of the problem. I think
that the most one can do is list types of factors and apply them.
Two interesting issues surround these factors. First, the factors may
be too vague as a guide to conduct. Are corporate executives not entitled
to demand from the law some reasonably certain rules? But if the answer
to that is yes, does that not lead back to a rigid test? My answer to that is
the factors set out by Justice Laskin are not all that vague or difficult to
apply. They simply recognize the complexity of commercial life. Execu-
tives and other fiduciary officers know when they are crossing the line
and when they are not.
Secondly, there also may be a "loosening factor" in Justice Laskin's
judgment. That is, it does not necessarily follow from his judgment that
he would, applying those factors, reach the same conclusion in Regal
(Hastings) as the House of Lords did. If one looks at all those factors, it
might be the case that a different result would be reached in both Regal
(Hastings) and Abbey Glen. That at least seems to me a possibility.
Lastly, I would point out two recent legislative developments in
Canada. Canadian corporation law was dramatically reformed at the
federal level in 1975 by the new Canada Business Corporations Act. (In
Canadian law there is incorporation at the federal as well as at the pro-
vincial level.) The federal Act has been followed by all provinces except
British Columbia, which closely follows its most important aspects. It
has introduced a great deal of uniformity into Canadian law.
Its reforms include a much broadened shareholders derivative ac-
tion as well as a new open-ended oppression remedy. Both of these pro-
visions allow for ease of access to the courts by aggrieved shareholders.
In the derivative action, no security for costs may be ordered. Indeed,
interim costs may be granted to the applicant. It is highly unlikely in the
context of the wording of the legislation that the business judgment rule
would be applied with respect to litigation committees.
The derivative shareholders' action has been broadened with greater
ease of access. The oppression remedy is extraordinarily broad and gives
35 Ibid. at 612 (quoting Note, "Corporate Opportunity" (1961) 74 Harv. L. Rev. 765).
36 Ibid. at 620.
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an equitable, roving jurisdiction to the court. Finally, the question of
ratification is handled by simply making it a piece of evidence that is to
be weighed by the court. Interested directors may vote in their capacity
as shareholders. Although this will be an important factor in weighing
the ratification, it will not be determinative of the matter at the outset.
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